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Abstract
Distributed machine learning has been widely studied in order to handle exploding
amount of data. In this paper, we study an important yet less visited distributed
learning problemwhere features are inherently distributed or vertically partitioned
among multiple parties, and sharing of raw data or model parameters among par-
ties is prohibited due to privacy concerns. We propose an ADMM sharing frame-
work to approach risk minimization over distributed features, where each party
only needs to share a single value for each sample in the training process, thus min-
imizing the data leakage risk. We establish convergence and iteration complexity
results for the proposed parallel ADMM algorithm under non-convex loss. We fur-
ther introduce a novel differentially private ADMM sharing algorithm and bound
the privacy guarantee with carefully designed noise perturbation. The experiments
based on a prototype system shows that the proposedADMM algorithms converge
efficiently in a robust fashion, demonstrating advantage over gradient based meth-
ods especially for data set with high dimensional feature spaces.
1 Introduction
The effectiveness of a machine learning model does not only depend on the quantity of samples,
but also the quality of data, especially the availability of high-quality features. Recently, a wide
range of distributed and collaborative machine learning schemes, including gradient-based meth-
ods Li et al. (2014a,b); Hsieh et al. (2017); Ho et al. (2013) and ADMM-based methods Zhang et al.
(2018); Shi et al. (2014); Zhang and Zhu (2016a); Huang et al. (2018), have been proposed to enable
learning from distributed samples, since collecting data for centralized learning will incur compli-
ance overhead, privacy concerns, or even judicial issues. Most existing schemes, however, are under
the umbrella of data parallel schemes, where multiple parties possess different training samples,
each sample with the same set of features. For example, different users hold different images to
jointly train a classifier.
An equally important scenario is to collaboratively learn from distributed features, where multiple
parties may possess different features about a same sample, yet do not wish to share these features
with each other. Examples include a user’s behavioural data logged by multiple apps, a patient’s
record stored at different hospitals and clinics, a user’s investment behavior logged by multiple
financial institutions and government agencies and so forth. The question is—how can we train
a joint model to make predictions about a sample leveraging the potentially rich and vast features
possessed by other parties, without requiring different parties to share their data to each other?
The motivation of gleaning insights from vertically partitioned data dates back to association
rule mining Vaidya and Clifton (2002, 2003). A few very recent studies Kenthapadi et al. (2013);
Ying et al. (2018); Hu et al. (2019); Heinze-Deml et al. (2018); Dai et al. (2018); Stolpe et al. (2016)
have reinvestigated vertically partitioned features under the setting of distributed machine learning,
which is motivated by the ever-increasing data dimensionality as well as the opportunity and chal-
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lenge of cooperation between multiple parties that may hold different aspects of information about
the same samples.
In this paper, we propose an ADMM algorithm to solve the empirical risk minimization (ERM)
problem, a general optimization formulation of many machine learning models visited by a number
of recent studies on distributed machine learning Ying et al. (2018); Chaudhuri et al. (2011). We
propose an ADMM-sharing-based distributed algorithm to solve ERM, in which each participant
does not need to share any raw features or local model parameters to other parties. Instead, each
party only transmits a single value for each sample to other parties, thus largely preventing the
local features from being disclosed. We establish theoretical convergence guarantees and iteration
complexity results under the non-convex loss in a fully parallel setting, whereas previously, the
convergence of ADMM sharing algorithm for non-convex losses is only known for the case of
sequential (Gauss-Seidel) execution Hong et al. (2016).
To further provide privacy guarantees, we present a privacy-preserving version of the ADMM shar-
ing algorithm, in which the transmitted value from each party is perturbed by a carefully designed
Gaussian noise to achieve the notion of ǫ, δ-differential privacy Dwork (2008); Dwork et al. (2014).
For distributed features, the perturbed algorithm ensures that the probability distribution of the val-
ues shared is relatively insensitive to any change to a single feature in a party’s local dataset.
Experimental results on two realistic datasets suggest that our proposed ADMM sharing algorithm
can converge efficiently. Compared to the gradient-based method, our method can scale as the
number of features increases and yields robust convergence. The algorithm can also converge with
moderate amounts of Gaussian perturbation added, therefore enabling the utilization of features
from other parties to improve the local machine learning task.
1.1 Related Work
Machine Learning Algorithms and Privacy. Chaudhuri and Monteleoni (2009) is one of the first
studies combing machine learning and differential privacy (DP), focusing on logistic regression.
Shokri and Shmatikov (2015) applies a variant of SGD to collaborative deep learning in a data-
parallel fashion and introduces its variant with DP. Abadi et al. (2016) provides a stronger differen-
tial privacy guarantee for training deep neural networks using a momentum accountant method.
Pathak et al. (2010); Rajkumar and Agarwal (2012) apply DP to collaborative machine learning,
with an inherent tradeoff between the privacy cost and utility achieved by the trained model. Re-
cently, DP has been applied to ADMM algorithms to solve multi-party machine learning problems
Zhang et al. (2018); Zhang and Zhu (2016a); Zhang et al. (2019); Zhang and Zhu (2017).
However, all the work above is targeting the data-parallel scenario, where samples are distributed
among nodes. The uniqueness of our work is to enable privacy-preserving machine learning among
nodes with vertically partitioned features, or in other words, the feature-parallel setting, which is
equally important and is yet to be explored.
Another approach to privacy-preserving machine learning is through encryption
Gilad-Bachrach et al. (2016); Takabi et al. (2016); Kikuchi et al. (2018) or secret sharing
Mohassel and Zhang (2017); Wan et al. (2007); Bonte and Vercauteren (2018), so that models
are trained on encrypted data. However, encryption cannot be generalized to all algorithms or
operations, and incurs additional computational cost.
Learning over Distributed Features. Gratton et al. (2018) applies ADMM to solve ridge regres-
sion. Ying et al. (2018) proposes a stochastic learning method via variance reduction. Zhou et al.
(2016) proposes a proximal gradient method and mainly focuses on speeding up training in a model-
parallel scenario. These studies do not consider the privacy issue. Hu et al. (2019) proposes a
composite model structure that can jointly learn from distributed features via a SGD-based algo-
rithm and its DP-enabled version, yet without offering theoretical privacy guarantees. Our work
establishes the first (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy guarantee result for learning over distributed features.
Experimental results further suggest that our ADMM sharing method converges in fewer epochs
than gradient methods in the case of high dimensional features. This is critical to preserving privacy
in machine learning since the privacy loss increases as the number of epochs increases Dwork et al.
(2014).
2
Querying Vertically Partitioned Data Privately. Vaidya and Clifton (2002); Evfimievski et al.
(2004); Dwork and Nissim (2004) are among the early studies that investigate the privacy issue of
querying vertically partitioned data. Kenthapadi et al. (2012) adopts a random-kernel-basedmethod
to mine vertically partitioned data privately. These studies provide privacy guarantees for simpler
static queries, while we focus on machine learning jobs, where the risk comes from the shared values
in the optimization algorithm. Our design simultaneously achieves minimum message passing, fast
convergence, and a theoretically bounded privacy cost under the DP framework.
2 Empirical Risk Minimization over Distributed Features
Consider N samples, each with d features distributed on M parties, which do not wish to share
data with each other. The entire dataset D ∈ RN × Rd can be viewed as M vertical partitions
D1, . . . ,DM , where Dm ∈ RN × Rdm denotes the data possessed by the mth party and dm is the
dimension of features on partym. Clearly, d =
∑M
m=1 dm. LetDi denote the ith row ofD, andDim
be the ith row of Dm (k = 1, · · · , N ). Then, we have
D =


D11 D12 · · · D1MD21 D22 · · · D2M
...
...
. . .
...
DN1 DN2 · · · DNM

 ,
where Dim ∈ Am ⊂ Rdm , (i = 1, · · · , N,m = 1, · · · ,M ). Let Yi ∈ {−1, 1}N be the label of
sample i.
Let x = (x⊤1 , · · · , x⊤m, · · · , x⊤M )⊤ represent the model parameters, where xm ∈ Rdm are the local
parameters associated with themth party. The objective is to find a model f(Di;x) with parameters
x to minimize the regularized empirical risk, i.e.,
minimize
x∈X
1
N
N∑
i=1
li(f(Di;x), Yi) + λR(x),
whereX ⊂ Rd is a closed convex set and the regularizerR(·) prevents overfitting.
Similar to recent literature on distributed machine learning Ying et al. (2018); Zhou et al. (2016),
ADMM Zhang and Zhu (2016a); Zhang et al. (2018), and privacy-preserving machine learning
Chaudhuri et al. (2011); Hamm et al. (2016), we assume the loss has a form
N∑
i=1
li(f(Di;x), Yi) =
N∑
i=1
li(Dix, Yi) = l
(
M∑
m=1
Dimxm
)
,
where we have abused the notation of l and in the second equality absorbed the label Yi into the loss
l, which is possibly a non-convex function. This framework incorporates a wide range of commonly
used models including support vector machines, Lasso, logistic regression, boosting, etc.
Therefore, the risk minimization over distributed features, or vertically partitioned datasets
D1, . . . ,DM , can be written in the following compact form:
minimize
x
l
(
M∑
m=1
Dmxm
)
+ λ
M∑
m=1
Rm(xm), (1)
subject to xm ∈ Xm,m = 1, . . . ,M, (2)
whereXm ⊂ Rdm is a closed convex set for allm.
We have further assumed the regularizer is separable such that R(x) =
∑M
m=1Rm(xm). This as-
sumption is consistent with our algorithm design philosophy—under vertically partitioned data, we
require each party focus on training and regularizing its local model xm, without sharing any local
model parameters or raw features to other parties at all.
3
Algorithm 1 The ADMM Sharing Algorithm
1: —–Each partym performs in parallel:
2: for t in 1, . . . , T do
3: Pull
∑
k Dkxtk − zt and yt from central node
4: Obtain
∑
k 6=mDkxtk − zt by subtracting the locally cached Dmxtm from the pulled value∑
kDkxtk − zt
5: Compute xt+1m according to (6)
6: Push Dmxt+1m to the central node
7: —–Central node:
8: for t in 1, . . . , T do
9: Collect Dmxt+1m for allm = 1, . . . ,M
10: Compute zt+1 according to (7)
11: Compute yt+1 according to (8)
12: Distribute
∑
k Dkxt+1k − zt+1 and yt+1 to all the parties.
3 The ADMM Sharing Algorithm
We present an ADMM sharing algorithm Boyd et al. (2011); Hong et al. (2016) to solve Problem (1)
and establish a convergence guarantee for the algorithm. Our algorithm requires each party only
share a single value to other parties in each iteration, thus requiring the minimum message passing.
In particular, Problem (1) is equivalent to
minimize
x
l (z) + λ
M∑
m=1
Rm(xm), (3)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
Dmxm − z = 0, xm ∈ XM ,m = 1, . . . ,M, (4)
where z is an auxiliary variable. The corresponding augmented Lagrangian is given by
L({x}, z; y) = l(z) + λ
M∑
m=1
Rm(xm) + 〈y,
M∑
m=1
Dmxm − z〉+ ρ
2
‖
M∑
m=1
Dmxm − z‖2, (5)
where y is the dual variable and ρ is the penalty factor. In the tth iteration of the algorithm, variables
are updated according to
xt+1m := argmin
xm∈Xm
λRm(xm) + 〈yt,Dmxm〉+ ρ
2
∥∥ M∑
k=1, k 6=m
Dkxtk +Dmxm − zt
∥∥2,
m = 1, · · · ,M (6)
zt+1 := argmin
z
l(z)− 〈yt, z〉+ ρ
2
∥∥ M∑
m=1
Dmxt+1m − z
∥∥2 (7)
yt+1 := yt + ρ
( M∑
m=1
Dmxt+1m − zt+1
)
. (8)
Formally, in a distributed and fully parallel manner, the algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. Note
that each party m needs the value
∑
k 6=mDkxtk − zt to complete the update, and Line 3, 4 and 12
in Algorithm 1 present a trick to reduce communication overhead.
3.1 Convergence Analysis
We follow Hong et al. Hong et al. (2016) to establish the convergence guarantee of the proposed
algorithm under mild assumptions. Note that Hong et al. (2016) provides convergence analysis for
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the Gauss-Seidel version of the ADMM sharing, where x1, . . . , xM are updated sequentially, which
is not naturally suitable to parallel implementation. In (6) of our algorithm, xm’s can be updated
by different parties in parallel in each iteration. We establish convergence as well as iteration com-
plexity results for this parallel scenario, which is more realistic in distributed learning. We need the
following set of common assumptions.
Assumption 1 1. There exists a positive constant L > 0 such that
‖∇l(x)−∇l(z)‖ ≤ L‖x− z‖ ∀x, z.
Moreover, for all m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, Xm’s are closed convex sets; each Dm is of full
column rank so that the minimum eigenvalue σmin(D⊤mDm) of matrix D⊤mDm is positive.
2. The penalty parameter ρ is chosen large enough such that
(a) each xm subproblem (6) as well as the z subproblem (7) is strongly convex, with
modulus {γm(ρ)}Mm=1 and γ(ρ), respectively.
(b) γm(ρ) ≥ 2σmax(D⊤mDm), ∀m, where σmax(D⊤mDm) is the maximum eigenvalue for
matrix D⊤mDm.
(c) ργ(ρ) > 2L2 and ρ ≥ L.
3. The objective function l
(∑M
m=1Dmxm
)
+ λ
∑M
m=1Rm(xm) in Problem 1 is lower
bounded over ΠMm=1Xm and we denote the lower bound as f .
4. Rm is either smooth nonconvex or convex (possibly nonsmooth). For the former case, there
exists Lm > 0 such that ‖∇Rm(xm) − ∇Rm(zm)‖ ≤ Lm‖xm − zm‖ for all xm, zm ∈
Xm.
Specifically, 1, 3 and 4 in Assumptions 1 are common settings in the literature. Assumptions 1.2 is
achievable if the ρ is chosen large enough.
DenoteM⊂ {1, 2, . . . ,M} as the index set, such that whenm ∈ M,Rm is convex, otherwise,Rm
is nonconvex but smooth. Our convergence results show that under mild assumptions, the iteratively
updated variables eventually converge to the set of primal-dual stationary solutions.
Theorem 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds true, we have the following results:
1. limt→∞ ‖
∑M
m=1Dmxt+1m − zt+1‖=0.
2. Any limit point {{x∗}, z∗; y∗} of the sequence {{xt+1}, zt+1; yt+1} is a stationary solution
of problem (1) in the sense that
x∗m ∈ argmin
xm∈Xm
λRm(xm) + 〈y∗,Dmxm〉,m ∈M, (9)
〈xm − x∗m, λ∇l(x∗m)−DTmy∗〉 ≤ 0 ∀xm ∈ Xm,m 6∈ M, (10)
∇l(z∗)− y∗ = 0, (11)
M∑
m=1
Dmx∗m = z∗. (12)
3. If Dm is a compact set for all m, then {{xtm}, zt; yt} converges to the set of stationary
solutions of problem (1), i.e.,
lim
t→∞
dist
(
({xt}, zt; yt);Z∗) = 0,
where Z∗ is the set of primal-dual stationary solutions for problem (1).
3.2 Iteration Complexity Analysis
We evaluate the iteration complexity over a Lyapunov function. More specifically, we define V t as
V t :=
M∑
m=1
‖∇˜xmL({xtm}, zt; yt)‖2 + ‖∇zL({xtm}, zt; yt)‖2 + ‖
M∑
m=1
Dmxtm − zt‖2, (13)
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where
∇˜xmL({xtm}, zt; yt) = ∇xmL({xtm}, zt; yt) whenm 6∈ M,
∇˜xmL({xtm}, zt; yt) = xtm − proxλRm
[
xtm −∇xm
(L({xtm}, zt; yt)− λ M∑
m=1
Rm(x
t
m)
)]
whenm ∈M,
with proxh[z] := argminxh(x) +
1
2‖x − z‖2. It is easy to verify that when V t → 0, a stationary
solution is achieved due to the properties. The result for the iteration complexity is stated in the
following theorem, which provides a quantification of how fast our algorithm converges. Theorem 2
shows that the algorithm converges in the sense that the Lyapunov function V t will be less than any
ǫ > 0 within O(1/ǫ) iterations.
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Let T (ǫ) denote the iteration index in which:
T (ǫ) := min{t|V t ≤ ǫ, t ≥ 0},
for any ǫ > 0. Then there exists a constant C > 0, such that
T (ǫ)ǫ ≤ C(L({x1}, z1; y1 − f), (14)
where f is the lower bound defined in Assumption 1.
4 Differentially Private ADMM Sharing
Differential privacy Dwork et al. (2014); Zhou et al. (2010) is a notion that ensures a strong guaran-
tee for data privacy. The intuition is to keep the query results from a dataset relatively close if one
of the entries in the dataset changes, by adding some well designed random noise into the query, so
that little information on the raw data can be inferred from the query. Formally, the definition of
differential privacy is given in Definition 1.
Definition 1 A randomized algorithmM is (ε, δ)−differentially private if for all S ⊂ range(M),
and for all x and y, such that |x− y|1 ≤ 1:
Pr(M(x)) ≤ exp(ε)Pr(M(y)) + δ. (15)
In our ADMM algorithm, the shared messages {Dmxt+1m }t=0,1,··· ,T−1 may reveal sensitive informa-
tion from the data entry inDm of Partym. We perturb the shared valueDmxt+1m in Algorithm 1 with
a carefully designed random noise to provide differential privacy. The resulted perturbed ADMM
sharing algorithm is the following updates:
xt+1m := argmin
xm∈Xm
λRm(xm) + 〈yt,Dmxm〉+ ρ
2
∥∥ M∑
k=1, k 6=m
Dkx˜tk +Dmxm − zt
∥∥2,
m = 1, · · · ,M
ξt+1m := N (0, σ2m,t+1(D⊤mDm)−1)
x˜t+1m := x
t+1
m + ξ
t+1
m (16)
zt+1 := argmin
z
l(z)− 〈yt, z〉+ ρ
2
∥∥ M∑
m=1
Dmx˜t+1m − z
∥∥2
yt+1 := yt + ρ
( M∑
m=1
Dmx˜t+1m − zt+1
)
.
In the remaining part of this section, we demonstrate that (16) guarantees (ε, δ) differential privacy
with outputs {Dmx˜t+1m }t=0,1,··· ,T−1 for some carefully selected σm,t+1. Beside Assumption 1, we
introduce another set of assumptions widely used by the literature.
Assumption 2 1. The feasible set {x, y} and the dual variable z are bounded; their l2 norms
have an upper bound b1.
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Figure 1: Performance over the a9a data set with 32561 training samples, 16281 testing samples
and 123 features.
2. The regularizer Rm(·) is doubly differentiable with |R′′m(·)| ≤ c1, where c1 is a finite
constant.
3. Each row of Dm is normalized and has an l2 norm of 1.
Note that Assumption 2.1 is adopted in Sarwate and Chaudhuri (2013) and Wang et al. (2019). As-
sumption 2.2 comes from Zhang and Zhu (2016b) and Assumption 2.3 comes from Zhang and Zhu
(2016b) and Sarwate and Chaudhuri (2013). As a typical method in differential privacy analysis, we
first study the l2 sensitivity of Dmxt+1m , which is defined by:
Definition 2 The l2-norm sensitivity of Dmxt+1m is defined by:
∆m,2 = max
Dm,D
′
m
‖Dm−D
′
m‖≤1
‖Dmxt+1m,Dm −D′mxt+1m,D′m‖.
where Dm and D′m are two neighbouring datasets differing in only one feature column, and xt+1m,Dm
is the xt+1m derived from the first line of equation (16) under dataset Dm.
We have Lemma 1 to state the upper bound of the l2-norm sensitivity of Dmxt+1m .
Lemma 1 Assume that Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold. Then the l2-norm sensitivity of
Dmxt+1m,Dm is upper bounded by C = 3dmρ [λc1 + (1 +Mρ)b1].
Theorem 3 Assume assumptions 2.1-2.3 hold and C is the upper bound of ∆m,2. Let ε ∈ (0, 1]
be an arbitrary constant and let Dmξt+1m be sampled from zero-mean Gaussian distribution with
variance σ2m,t+1, where
σm,t+1 =
√
2ln(1.25/δ)C
ε
.
Then each iteration guarantees (ε, δ)-differential privacy. Specifically, for any neighboring datasets
Dm and D′m, for any outputDmx˜t+1m,Dm and D′mx˜t+1m,D′m , the following inequality always holds:
P (Dmx˜t+1m,Dm |Dm) ≤ eεP (D′mx˜t+1m,D′m |D
′
m) + δ.
With an application of the composition theory in Dwork et al. (2014), we come to a result stating the
overall privacy guarantee for the whole training procedure.
Corollary 1 For any δ′ > 0, the algorithm described in (16) satisfies (ε′, T δ + δ′)−differential
privacy within T epochs of updates, where
ε′ =
√
2T ln(1/δ′)ε+ Tε(eε − 1). (17)
5 Experiments
We test our algorithm by training l2-norm regularized logistic regression on two popular public
datasets, namely, a9a from UCI Dua and Graff (2017) and giette Guyon et al. (2005). We get the
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Figure 3: Test performance for ADMM under different levels of added noise.
datasets from Lib ([n.d.]) so that we follow the same preprocessing procedure listed there. a9a
dataset is 4 MB and contains 32561 training samples, 16281 testing samples and 123 features. We
divide the dataset into two parts, with the first part containing the first 66 features and the second
part remaining 57 features. The first part is regarded as the local party who wishes to improve its
prediction model with the help of data from the other party. On the other hand, gisette dataset is
297MB and contains 6000 training samples, 1000 testing samples and 5000 features. Similarly, we
divide the features into 3 parts, the first 2000 features being the first part regarded as the local data,
the next 2000 features being the second part, and the remaining 1000 as the third part. Note that a9a
is small in terms of the number of features and gisette has a relatively higher dimensional feature
space.
A prototype system is implemented in Python to verify our proposed algorithm. Specifically, we
use optimization library from scipy to handle the optimization subproblems. We apply L-BFGS-B
algorithm to do the x update in (6) and entry-wise optimization for z in (7). We run the experiment
on a machine equipped with Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-9900X CPU@ 3.50GHz and 128 GB of memory.
We compare our algorithm against an SGD based algorithm proposed in Hu et al. (2019). We keep
track of the training objective value (log loss plus the l2 regularizer), the testing log loss for each
epoch for different datasets and parameter settings. We also test our algorithm with different levels
of Gaussian noise added. In the training procedure, we initialize the elements in x, y and z with 0
while we initialize the parameter for the SGD-based algorithm with random numbers.
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show a typical trace of the training objective and testing log loss against epochs
for a9a and gisette, respectively. On a9a, the ADMM algorithm is slightly slower than the SGD
based algorithm, while they reach the same testing log loss in the end. On gisette, the SGD based
algorithm converges slowly while the ADMM algorithm is efficient and robust. The testing log
loss from the ADMM algorithm quickly converges to 0.08 after a few epochs, but the SGD based
algorithm converges to only 0.1 with much more epochs. This shows that the ADMM algorithm
is superior when the number of features is large. In fact, for each epoch, the x update is a trivial
quadratic program and can be efficiently solved numerically. The z update contains optimization
over computationally expensive functions, but for each sample, it is always an optimization over a
single scalar so that it can be solved efficiently via scalar optimization and scales with the number
of features.
Fig. 3 shows the testing loss for ADMM with different levels of Gaussian noise added. The other
two baselines are the logistic regression model trained over all the features (in a centralized way) and
that trained over only the local features in the first party. The baselines are trained with the built-in
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logistic regression function from sklearn library. We can see that there is a significant performance
boost if we employmore features to help training the model on Party 1. Interestingly, in Fig. 3(b), the
ADMM sharing has even better performance than the baseline trained with all features with sklearn.
It further shows that the ADMM sharing is better at datasets with a large number of features.
Moreover, after applying moderate random perturbations, the proposed algorithm can still converge
in a relatively small number of epochs, as Fig. 1(b) and Fig. 2(b) suggest, although too much noise
may ruin the model. Therefore, ADMM sharing algorithm under moderate perturbation can improve
the local model and the privacy cost is well contained as the algorithm converges in a few epochs.
6 Conclusion
We study learning over distributed features (vertically partitioned data) where none of the parties
shall share the local data. We propose the parallel ADMM sharing algorithm to solve this challeng-
ing problem where only intermediate values are shared, without even sharing model parameters. We
have shown the convergence for convex and non-convex loss functions. To further protect the data
privacy, we apply the differential privacy technique in the training procedure to derive a privacy
guarantee within T epochs. We implement a prototype system and evaluate the proposed algorithm
on two representative datasets in risk minimization. The result shows that the ADMM sharing al-
gorithm converges efficiently, especially on dataset with large number of features. Furthermore, the
differentially private ADMM algorithm yields better prediction accuracy than model trained from
only local features while ensuring a certain level of differential privacy guarantee.
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7 Supplementary Materials
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
To help theoretical analysis, we denote the objective functions in (6) and (7) as
gm(xm) = λRm(xm) + 〈yt,Dmxm〉+ ρ
2
∥∥ M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkxtk +Dmxm − zt
∥∥2,
h(z) = l(z)− 〈yt, z〉+ ρ
2
∥∥ M∑
m=1
Dmxt+1m − z
∥∥2, (18)
correspondingly. We prove the following four lemmas to help prove the theorem.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1, we have
∇l(zt+1) = yt+1,
and
‖yt+1 − yt‖2 ≤ L2‖zt+1 − zt‖2.
Proof. By the optimality in (7), we have
∇l(zt+1)− yt + ρ(zt+1 − M∑
m=1
Dmxt+1m
)
= 0.
Combined with (8), we can get
∇l(zt+1) = yt+1. (19)
Combined with Assumption 1.1, we have
‖yt+1 − yt‖2 = ‖∇l(zt+1)−∇l(zt)‖2 ≤ L2‖zt+1 − zt‖2. (20)

Lemma 3 We have
(‖ M∑
m=1
xt+1m − z‖2 − ‖
M∑
m=1
xtm − z‖2
)− M∑
m=1
(‖ M∑
k=1
k 6=m
xtk + x
t+1
m − z‖2 − ‖
M∑
m=1
xtm − z‖2
)
≤
M∑
m=1
‖xt+1m − xtm‖2. (21)
Proof.
LHS =
( M∑
m=1
(xt+1m + x
t
m)− 2z
)⊤( M∑
m=1
xt+1m −
M∑
m=1
xtm)−
M∑
m=1
( M∑
k=1
k 6=m
2xtk + x
t
m + x
t+1
m − 2z
)⊤(xt+1m − xtm)
=−
M∑
m=1
M∑
k=1
k 6=m
(xt+1k − xtk)⊤(xt+1m − xtm)
=− ‖
M∑
m=1
(xt+1m − xtm)‖2 +
M∑
m=1
‖xt+1m − xtm‖2
≤
M∑
m=1
‖xt+1m − xtm‖2.

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Lemma 4 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. We have
L({xt+1m }, zt+1; yt+1)− L({xtm}, zt; yt)
≤
M∑
m=1
−
(
γm(ρ)
2
− σmax(D⊤mDm)
)
‖xt+1m − xtm‖2 −
(
γ(ρ)
2
− L
2
ρ
)
‖zt+1 − zt‖2.
Proof. The LFH can be decomposed into two parts as
L({xt+1m }, zt+1; yt+1)− L({xtm}, zt; yt)
=
(L({xt+1m }, zt+1; yt+1)− L({xt+1m }, zt+1; yt))
+
(L({xt+1m }, zt+1; yt)− L({xtm}, zt; yt)). (22)
For the first term, we have
L({xt+1j }, zt+1; yt+1)− L({xt+1j }, zt+1; yt)
=〈yt+1 − yt,
∑
j
Djx
t+1
j − zt+1〉
=
1
ρ
‖yt+1 − yt‖2 (by (8))
=
L2
ρ
‖zt+1 − zt‖2 (by Lemma 2). (23)
For the second term, we have
L({xt+1m }, zt+1; yt)− L({xtm}, zt; yt)
=L({xt+1m }, zt+1; yt)− L({xtm}, zt+1; yt) + L({xtm}, zt+1; yt)− L({xtm}, zt; yt)
≤
((
λ
M∑
m=1
Rm(x
t+1
m ) + 〈yt,
M∑
m=1
Dmxt+1m 〉+
ρ
2
∥∥ M∑
k=1
Dkxt+1k − zt+1
∥∥2)
− (λ M∑
m=1
Rm(x
t
m) + 〈yt,
M∑
m=1
Dmxtm〉+
ρ
2
∥∥ M∑
k=1
Dkxtk − zt+1
∥∥2))
+
((
l(zt+1)− 〈yt, zt+1〉+ ρ
2
∥∥ M∑
m=1
Dmxt+1m − zt+1
∥∥2)− (l(zt)− 〈yt, zt〉+ ρ
2
∥∥ M∑
m=1
Dmxt+1m − zt
∥∥2))
≤
M∑
m=1
((
λRm(x
t+1
m ) + 〈yt,Dmxt+1m 〉+
ρ
2
∥∥ M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkxtk +Dmxt+1m − zt+1
∥∥2)
− (λRm(xtm) + 〈yt,Dmxtm〉+ ρ2
∥∥ M∑
k=1
Dkxtk − zt+1
∥∥2))+ M∑
m=1
‖Dm(xt+1m − xtm)‖2
+
((
l(zt+1)− 〈yt, zt+1〉+ ρ
2
∥∥ M∑
m=1
Dmxt+1m − zt+1
∥∥2)
− (l(zt)− 〈yt, zt〉+ ρ
2
∥∥ M∑
m=1
Dmxt+1m − zt
∥∥2)) (by Lemma 3)
=
M∑
m=1
(
gm(x
t+1
m )− gm(xtm)
)
+ (h(zt+1)− h(zT ))) +
M∑
m=1
‖Dm(xt+1m − xtm)‖2
≤
M∑
m=1
(〈∇gm(xt+1m ), xt+1m − xtm〉 − γm(ρ)2 ‖xt+1m − xtm‖2)+ 〈∇h(zt+1), zt+1 − zt〉 − γ(ρ)2 ‖zt+1 − zt‖2
+
M∑
m=1
‖Dm(xt+1m − xtm)‖2 (by strongly convexity from Assumption 1.2)
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≤−
M∑
m=1
γm(ρ)
2
‖xt+1m − xtm‖2 −
γ(ρ)
2
‖zt+1 − zt‖2 +
M∑
m=1
‖Dm(xt+1m − xtm)‖2
(by optimality condition for subproblem in (6) and (7))
≤
M∑
m=1
−
(
γm(ρ)
2
− σmax(D⊤mDm)
)
‖xt+1m − xtm‖2 −
γ(ρ)
2
‖zt+1 − zt‖2. (24)
Note that we have abused the notation ∇gm(xm) and denote it as the subgradient when g is non-
smooth but convex. Combining (22), (23) and (24), the lemma is proved. 
Lemma 5 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then the following limit exists and is bounded from below:
lim
t→∞
L({xt+1}, zt+1; yt+1). (25)
Proof.
L({xt+1}, zt+1; yt+1)
=l(zt+1) + λ
M∑
m=1
Rm(x
t+1
m ) + 〈yt+1,
M∑
m=1
Dmxt+1m − zt+1〉+
ρ
2
‖Dmxt+1m − zt+1‖2
=λ
M∑
m=1
Rm(x
t+1
m ) + l(z
t+1) + 〈∇l(zt+1),
M∑
m=1
Dmxt+1m − zt+1〉+
ρ
2
‖Dmxt+1m − zt+1‖2 (by Lemma 2)
≥λ
M∑
m=1
Rm(x
t+1
m ) + l(
M∑
m=1
Dmxt+1m ) +
ρ− L
2
‖Dmxt+1m − zt+1‖2. (26)
Combinedwith Assumption 1.3, L({xt+1}, zt+1; yt+1) is lower bounded. Furthermore, by Assump-
tion 1.2 and Lemma 4, L({xt+1}, zt+1; yt+1) is decreasing. These complete the proof. 
Now we are ready for the proof.
Part 1. By Assumption 1.2, Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we have
‖xt+1m − xtm‖ → 0 ∀m = 1, 2, . . . ,M,
‖zt+1 − zt‖ → 0.
Combined with Lemma 2, we have
‖yt+1 − yt‖2 → 0.
Combined with (8), we complete the proof for Part 1.
Part 2. Due to the fact that ‖yt+1 − yt‖2 → 0, by taking limit in (8), we can get (12).
At each iteration t+ 1, by the optimality of the subproblem in (7), we have
∇l(zt+1)− yt + ρ(zt+1 −
M∑
m=1
Dmxt+1m ) = 0. (27)
Combined with (12) and taking the limit, we get (11).
Similarly, by the optimality of the subproblem in (6), for ∀m ∈M there exists ηt+1m ∈ ∂Rm(xt+1m ),
such that
〈
xm − xt+1m , ληt+1m +DTmyt + ρDTm
( M∑
k=1
k≤m
Dkxt+1k +
M∑
k=1
k>j
Dkxtk − zt
)〉 ≥ 0 ∀xm ∈ Xm. (28)
Since Rm is convex, we have
λRm(xm)− λRm(xt+1m ) +
〈
x− xt+1m ,D⊤myt + ρ
( M∑
k=1
k≤m
Dkxt+1k +
M∑
k=1
k>j
Dkxtk − zt
)TDj〉 ≥ 0 ∀xm ∈ Xm.
(29)
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Combined with (12) and the fact ‖xt+1m − xtm‖ → 0, by taking the limit, we get
λRm(xm)− λRm(x∗m) +
〈
x− x∗m,D⊤my∗
〉 ≥ 0 ∀xm ∈ Xm, ∀m, (30)
which is equivalent to
λRm(x) +
〈
y∗,Dmx
〉− λRm(x∗m)− 〈y∗,Dmx∗m〉 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ Xm, ∀m. (31)
And we can get the result in (9).
Whenm 6∈ M, we have
〈
xm − xt+1m , λ∇Rm(xt+1m ) +D⊤myt + ρ
( M∑
k=1
k≤m
Dkxt+1k +
M∑
k=1
k>j
Dkxtk − zt
)TDm〉 ≥ 0 ∀xm ∈ Xm.
(32)
Taking the limit and we can get (10).
Part 3. We first show that there exists a limit point for each of the sequences {xtm}, {zt} and {yt}.
Since Xm, ∀m is compact, {xtm} must have a limit point. With Theorem 1.1, we can get that {zt}
is also compact and has a limit point. Furthermore, with Lemma 2, we can get {yt} is also compact
and has a limit point.
We prove Part 3 by contradiction. Since {xtm}, {zt} and {yt} lie in some compact set, there exists
a subsequence {xtkm}, {ztk} and {ytk}, such that
({xtkm}, ztk ; ytk)→ ({xˆm}, zˆ; yˆ), (33)
where ({xˆm}, zˆ; yˆ) is some limit point and by part 2, we have ({xˆm}, zˆ; yˆ) ∈ Z∗. Suppose that
{{xtm}, zt; yt} does not converge to Z∗, since ({xtkm}, ztk ; ytk) is a subsequence of it, there exists
some γ > 0, such that
lim
k→∞
dist
(
({xtkm}, ztk ; ytk);Z∗
)
= γ > 0. (34)
From (33), there exists some J(γ) > 0, such that
‖({xtkm}, ztk ; ytk)− ({xˆm}, zˆ; yˆ)‖ ≤
γ
2
, ∀k ≥ J(γ). (35)
Since ({xˆm}, zˆ; yˆ) ∈ Z∗, we have
dist
(
({xtkm}, ztk ; ytk);Z∗
) ≤ dist(({xtkm}, ztk ; ytk); ({xˆm}, zˆ; yˆ)). (36)
From the above two inequalities, we must have
dist
(
({xtkm}, ztk ; ytk);Z∗
) ≤ γ
2
, ∀k ≥ J(γ), (37)
which contradicts to (34), completing the proof. 
7.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We first show an upper bound for V t.
1. Bound for ∇˜xmL({xtm}, zt; yt). Whenm ∈M, from the optimality condition in (6), we have
0 ∈ λ∂xmRj(xt+1m ) +D⊤yt + ρD⊤j
( M∑
k=1
k 6=j
Dkxtk +Dmxt+1m − zt
)
.
By some rearrangement, we have
(
xt+1m −D⊤yt − ρD⊤m
( M∑
k=1
k 6=j
Dkxtk +Dmxt+1m − zt
))− xt+1m ∈ λ∂xmRm(xt+1m ),
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which is equivalent to
xt+1m = proxλRm
[
xt+1m −D⊤yt − ρD⊤m
( M∑
k=1
k 6=j
Dkxtk +Dmxt+1m − zt
)]
. (38)
Therefore,
‖xtm − proxλRm
[
xtm −∇xm
(L({xtm}, zt; yt)− λ M∑
m=1
Rm(x
t
m)
)]‖
=
∥∥xtm − xt+1m + xt+1m − proxλRm[xtm −D⊤yt − ρD⊤m(
M∑
k=1
Dkxtk − zt
)]∥∥
≤‖xtm − xt+1m ‖+
∥∥proxλRm[xt+1m −D⊤yt − ρDTm(
M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkxtk +Dmxt+1m − zt
)]
− proxλRm
[
xtm −D⊤yt − ρDTm
( M∑
k=1
Dkxtk − zt
)]∥∥
≤ 2‖xtm − xt+1m ‖+ ρ‖D⊤mDm(xt+1m − xtm)‖. (39)
Whenm 6∈ M, similarly, we have
λ∇xmRm(xt+1m ) +D⊤yt + ρD⊤m
( M∑
k=1
k 6=j
Dkxtk +Dmxt+1m − zt
)
= 0. (40)
Therefore,
‖∇xmL({xtm}, zt; yt)‖
=‖λ∇xmRm(xtm) +D⊤yt + ρD⊤m
( M∑
k=1
Dkxtk − zt
)‖
=‖λ∇xmRm(xtm) +D⊤yt + ρDTm
( M∑
k=1
Dkxtk − zt
)
− (λ∇xmRm(xt+1m ) +D⊤yt + ρDTm( M∑
k=1
k 6=j
Dkxtk +Dmxt+1m − zt
))‖
≤λ‖∇xmRm(xtm)−∇xmRm(xt+1m )‖+ ρ‖D⊤mDm(xt+1m − xtm)‖
≤Lm‖xt+1m − xtm‖+ ρ‖D⊤mDm(xt+1m − xtm)‖. (by Assumption 1.4) (41)
2. Bound for ‖∇zL({xtm}, zt; yt)‖. By optimality condition in (7), we have
∇l(zt+1)− yt + ρ(zt+1 − M∑
m=1
Dmxt+1m
)
= 0.
Therefore
‖∇zL({xtm}, zt; yt)‖
=‖l(zt)− yt + ρ(zt − M∑
m=1
Dmxtm
)‖
=‖l(zt)− yt + ρ(zt − M∑
m=1
Dmxtm
)− (l(zt+1)− yt + ρ(zt+1 − M∑
m=1
Dmxt+1m
))‖
≤(L+ ρ)‖zt+1 − zt‖+ ρ
M∑
m=1
‖Dm(xt+1m − xtm)‖. (42)
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3. Bound for ‖∑Mm=1Dmxtm − zt‖. According to Lemma 2, we have
‖
M∑
m=1
Dmxtm − zt‖ =
1
ρ
‖yt+1 − yt‖ ≤ L
ρ
‖zt+1 − zt‖. (43)
Combining (39), (41), (42) and (43), we can conclude that there exists some C1 > 0, such that
V t ≤ C1(‖zt+1 − zt‖2 +
M∑
m=1
‖xt+1m − xtm‖2), (44)
By Lemma 4, there exists some constant C2 = min{
∑M
m=1
γm(ρ)
2 ,
γ(ρ)
2 − L
2
ρ }, such that
L({xtm}, zt; yt)− L({xt+1m }, zt+1; yt+1)
≥C2(‖zt+1 − zt‖2 +
M∑
m=1
‖xt+1m − xtm‖2). (45)
By (44) and (45), we have
V t ≤ C1
C2
L({xtm}, zt; yt)− L({xt+1m }, zt+1; yt+1). (46)
Taking the sum over t = 1, . . . , T , we have
T∑
t=1
V t ≤C1
C2
L({x1}, z1; y1)− L({xt+1}, zt+1; yt+1)
≤C1
C2
(L({x1}, z1; y1)− f). (47)
By the definition of T (ǫ), we have
T (ǫ)ǫ ≤ C1
C2
(L({x1}, z1; y1)− f). (48)
By taking C = C1C2 , we complete the proof. 
7.3 Proof of Lemma 1
From the optimality condition of the x update procedure in (16), we can get
Dmxt+1m,Dm = −Dm(ρD⊤mDm)−1

λR′m(xt+1m,Dm) +D⊤myt + ρD⊤m(
M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkx˜k − z)

 ,
D′mxt+1m,D′m = −D
′
m(ρD′⊤mD′m)−1

λR′m(xt+1m,D′m) +D′⊤m yt + ρD′⊤m (
M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkx˜k − z)

 .
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Therefore we have
Dmxt+1m,Dm −D′mxt+1m,D′m
= −Dm(ρD⊤mDm)−1

λR′m(xt+1m,Dm) +D⊤mytDm + ρD⊤m(
M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkx˜k − z)


+D′m(ρD′⊤mD′m)−1

λR′m(xt+1m,D′m) +D′⊤m yt + ρD′⊤m (
M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkx˜k − z)


= Dm(ρD⊤mDm)−1
×

λ(R′m(xt+1m,D′m)−R′m(xt+1m,Dm)) + (D′m −Dm)⊤yt + ρ(D′m −Dm)⊤(
M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkx˜k − z)


+ [D′m(ρD′⊤mD′m)−1 −Dm(ρD⊤mDm)−1]
×

λR′m(xt+1m,D′m) +D′⊤m yt + ρD′⊤m (
M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkx˜k − z)

 .
Denote
Φ1 = Dm(ρD⊤mDm)−1
×

λ(R′m(xt+1m,D′m)−R′m(xt+1m,Dm)) + (D′m −Dm)⊤yt + ρ(D′m −Dm)⊤(
M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkx˜k − z)

 ,
Φ2 = [D′m(ρD′⊤mD′m)−1 −Dm(ρD⊤mDm)−1]
×

λR′m(xt+1m,D′m) +D′⊤m yt + ρD′⊤m (
M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkx˜k − z)

 .
As a result:
Dmxt+1m,Dm −D′mxt+1m,D′m = Φ1 +Φ2. (49)
In the following, we will analyze the components in (49) term by term. The object is to prove
max Dm,D′m
‖Dm−D
′
m‖≤1
‖xt+1m,Dm − xt+1m,D′m‖ is bounded. To see this, notice that
max
Dm,D
′
m
‖Dm−D
′
m‖≤1
‖Dmxt+1m,Dm −D′mxt+1m,D′m‖
≤ max
Dm,D
′
m
‖Dm−D
′
m‖≤1
‖Φ1‖+ max
Dm,D
′
m
‖Dm−D
′
m‖≤1
‖Φ2‖.
Formax Dm,D′m
‖Dm−D
′
m‖≤1
‖Φ2‖, from assumption 2.3, we have
max
Dm,D
′
m
‖Dm−D
′
m‖≤1
‖Φ2‖
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
dmρ

λR′m(xt+1m,D′m) +D′⊤m yt + ρD′⊤m (
M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkx˜k − z)


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
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By mean value theorem, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
dmρ

λD′⊤m R′′m(x∗) +D′⊤m yt + ρD′⊤m ( M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkx˜k − z)


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2
dmρ

λ‖R′′m(·)‖+ ‖yt‖+ ρ‖(
M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkx˜k − z)‖

 .
Formax Dm,D′m
‖Dm−D
′
m‖≤1
‖Φ1‖, we have
max
Dm,D
′
m
‖Dm−D
′
m‖≤1
‖Φ1‖ ≤
∣∣∣∣Dm(ρD⊤mDm)−1
×

λ(R′m(xt+1m,D′m)−R′m(xt+1m,Dm)) + (D′m −Dm)⊤yt + ρ(D′m −Dm)⊤(
M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkx˜k − z)


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ρ−1‖(D⊤mDm)−1‖

λ‖R′′m(·)‖ + ‖yt‖+ ρ‖(
M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkx˜k − z)⊤‖


=
1
dmρ

λ‖R′′m(·)‖ + ‖yt‖+ ρ‖( M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkx˜k − z)‖

 .
Thus by assumption 2.1-2.2
max
Dm,D
′
m
‖Dm−D
′
m‖≤1
‖Dmxt+1m,Dm −D′mxt+1m,D′m‖
≤ 3
dmρ

λc1 + ‖yt‖+ ρ‖( M∑
k=1
k 6=m
Dkx˜k − z)⊤‖


≤ 3
dmρ

λc1 + ‖yt‖+ ρ‖z‖+ ρ M∑
k=1
k 6=m
‖x˜k‖


≤ 3
dmρ
[λc1 + (1 +Mρ)b1]
is bounded. 
7.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: The privacy loss fromDmx˜
t+1
m is calculated by:
∣∣∣∣lnP (Dmx˜t+1m |Dm)P (D′mx˜t+1m |D′m)
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ln P (Dmx˜
t+1
m,Dm
+Dmξt+1m )
P (D′mx˜t+1m,D′m +D′mξ
′,t+1
m )
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ln P (Dmξt+1m )P (D′mξ′,t+1m )
∣∣∣∣ .
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Since Dmξt+1m and D′mξ′,t+1m are sampled fromN (0, σ2m,t+1), combine with lemma 1, we have∣∣∣∣ln P (Dmξt+1m )P (D′mξ′,t+1m )
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
2ξt+1m ‖Dmxt+1m,Dm −D′mxt+1m,D′m‖+ ‖Dmx
t+1
m,Dm
−D′mxt+1m,D′m‖2
2σ2m,t+1
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣2Dmξ
t+1
m C+ C
2
2C
2·2ln(1.25/σ)
ε2
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣(2Dmξt+1m + C)ε24Cln(1.25/σ)
∣∣∣∣ .
In order to make
∣∣∣ (2Dmξt+1m +C)ε24Cln(1.25/σ) ∣∣∣ ≤ ε, we need to make sure
∣∣Dmξt+1m ∣∣ ≤ 2Cln(1.25/σ)ε − C2 .
In the following, we need to proof
P (
∣∣Dmξt+1m ∣∣ ≥ 2Cln(1.25/σ)ε − C2 ) ≤ δ (50)
holds. However, we will proof a stronger result that lead to (50). Which is
P (Dmξt+1m ≥
2Cln(1.25/σ)
ε
− C
2
) ≤ δ
2
.
Since the tail bound of normal distributionN (0, σ2m,t+1) is:
P (Dmξt+1m > r) ≤
σm,t+1
r
√
2π
e
− r
2
2σ2
m,t+1 .
Let r = 2Cln(1.25/σ)ε − C2 , we then have
P (Dmξt+1m ≥
2Cln(1.25/σ)
ε
− C
2
)
≤ C
√
2ln(1.25/σ)
r
√
2πε
exp
[
− [4ln(1.25/σ)− ε]
2
8ln(1.25/σ)
]
.
When δ is small and let ε ≤ 1, we then have√
2ln(1.25/σ)2
(4ln(1.25/σ)− ε)√2π ≤
√
2ln(1.25/σ)2
(4ln(1.25/σ)− 1)√2π <
1√
2π
. (51)
As a result, we can proof that
− [4ln(1.25/σ)− ε]
2
8ln(1.25/σ)
< ln(
√
2π
δ
2
)
by equation (51). Thus we have
P (Dmξt+1m ≥
2Cln(1.25/σ)
ε
− C
2
) <
1√
2π
exp(ln(
√
2π
δ
2
) =
δ
2
.
Thus we proved (50) holds. Define
A1 = {Dmξt+1m : |Dmξt+1m | ≤
1√
2π
exp(ln(
√
2π
δ
2
},
A2 = {Dmξt+1m : |Dmξt+1m | >
1√
2π
exp(ln(
√
2π
δ
2
}.
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Thus we obtain the desired result:
P (D′mx˜t+1m |Dm)
= P (Dmxt+1m,Dm +Dmξt+1m : Dmξt+1m ∈ A1)
+P (Dmxt+1m,Dm +Dmξt+1m : Dmξt+1m ∈ A2)
< eεP (Dmxt+1m,D′m +Dmξ
′,t+1
m ) + δ = e
εP (Dmx˜t+1m |D′m) + δ.

7.5 Implementation
The implementation of the prototype system can be found at
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/imfz3k2fhf3zkrc/AACcbREvj_PBSjEUdZmBfoFUa?dl=0.
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